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PROPAGANDA BY PERMISSION: EXAMINING “POLITICAL 









Enacted in response to the spread of Nazi propaganda and other subversive 
material in the interwar period, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) 
remains at the vanguard of exposing, and thereby deterring, foreign influence 
campaigns within the United States.   
Adopting a disclosure-based approach, FARA prioritizes information 
symmetry and transparency over the prohibition of any specific activities or content.  
Under the statute, individuals and entities (agents) acting on behalf of foreign 
principals are required to register, disclose their ongoing activities, and file copies of 
material circulated on behalf of their principals.  Notably, agents are required to make 
“detailed” disclosures regarding activities considered “political” in nature, as defined 
by the statute.  Of the activities covered under FARA, “political activities” are 
potentially the most impactful in nature and, if unchecked, can cause the most harm.  
These filings are intended to place stakeholders, including the American 
public, on notice about the activities of foreign agents within the U.S. Within this 
context, the quality and level of disclosures made by agents under FARA are not only 
standards for compliance but also determine the overall effectiveness of a statute that 
is premised on bringing transparency to foreign influence efforts. This question of 
effectiveness assumed all the more importance within context of recent concerns 
around foreign interference in U.S. democratic processes.   
 
* The author is an attorney admitted to practice law in the United States (California) and in India.  He 
received his legal education from the National Law School of India University, Bangalore and Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington D.C. Among other affiliations, he has also served as a consultant to the 
Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative (“FITI”), housed at the Center for International Policy in Washington, 
D.C.  His writing around FARA and global policy responses to foreign influence has featured in a number of 
online portals and blogs, including Just Security, the Harvard Journal of International Law, and RUSI’s 
Newsbrief. The author is grateful to Ben Freeman, Director of FITI, for his encouragement to pursue this line 
of research and for his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.  All views expressed in this Article are 
personal and all errors are solely the author’s. This Article considers filings and forms available on the 
FARA.GOV database as were current and available online at the end of March 2020. 
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Comprehensive disclosures which provide sufficient notice and details of the 
“political activities” of an agent help achieve the underlying transparency-linked 
objectives of FARA, while vague or incomplete filings have the opposite effect.  After 
providing a background to FARA, this Article studies this issue first, by seeking to 
draw out the background, development, and surprisingly ambiguous legal standards 
that disclosures of agents’ “political activities” must adhere to. Second, based on an 
survey of a sample set of filings made under FARA, it analyzes if these standards are 
adhered to in practice.  Learnings from this exercise are then used to evolve 
recommendations to strengthen the capacity of FARA to counter foreign influence 
operations. 
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 INTRODUCTION  
 
The history of influence activities is indistinguishable from the history of 
governments in general.  For as long as empowered individuals and groups have been 
responsible for governing societies, others have sought to influence them and their 
decision-making.1  In the words of one author, such activities are both “natural and 
inevitable.”2  Despite their longevity, the methods, origins, and targets have evolved 
over time.3  While most types of influence activities––such as lobbying4––are legal, 
there remains a need to continually review and evolve the statutes intended to check 
less-welcome, covert, and undue forms of influence within a country’s democratic 
sphere.  With recent controversies in the space being triggered by concerns around 
Russian-origin information operations, fake news, and election interference,5 the 
spotlight has shifted to sources of influence emanating across international borders 
and the effectiveness of the legal frameworks intended to counter them.   
Within this context, a key statute within the U.S. that aims to regulate 
foreign-origin influence activities is the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), 
originally enacted in 1938.6  Rather than prohibiting any specific type of influence 
activity or material, FARA requires that individuals and entities acting on behalf of 
foreign principals (“foreign agents” or “registrants”) register and disclose information 
about their activities.  These disclosures are intended to ensure that stakeholders, 
including the American public and members of the executive and legislative branches 
of government, are placed on notice about the identities of foreign agents and their 
activities.7 
While recent controversies have resulted in renewed scrutiny of FARA and 
gaps in its disclosure-based approach, existing literature fails to analyze questions 
around the quality of disclosures made by agents under the statute.  This Article 
crucially aims to fill this gap in scholarship, vague, insufficient, or inaccurate filings, 
if unchecked, have the potential to call into question the very foundations of the 
disclosure-based approach upon which FARA is premised.  In other words, if FARA 
– as a statutory framework – is not effective in practice, the U.S. remains susceptible 
to foreign-origin influence operations.  An ineffective FARA would not only result 
 
1 LIONEL ZETTER, LOBBYING: THE ART OF POLITICAL PERSUASION 8 (2d ed. 2011). 
2 Id. (emphasis added). 
3 Id. at 8–9; THOMAS T. HOLYOKE, INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYING: PURSUING POLITICAL INTERESTS 
IN AMERICA 20–30 (2016) (chronicling the evolution of the lobbying and the right to petition through history). 
4 For a legal definition of the term, see Disclosure of Lobbying Activities, 2 U.S.C. § 1602(7) (2020); 
anecdotally, the term “lobbying” itself is said to have emerged in Washington in the 1860s.  See ZETTER, supra 
note 1, at 8 (“Those seeking to influence President Ulysses S Grant would congregate in the lobby of the Willard 
Hotel and try to attract the great man’s attention as he headed towards the hotel bar, in order to raise specific 
areas of concern with him.  Legend has it that after a while President Grant tired of their attentions and referred 
them scornfully as lobbyists.”). 
5 See, e.g., OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND 
INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS” THE ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf; ELIZABETH BODINE-BARON ET AL., COUNTERING 
RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA INFLUENCE, RAND CORP. (2018), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2740/RAND_RR2740.pdf. 
6 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 
611–621 (2018)). 
7 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2 (1937). 
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in poorer transparency in relation to covered activities, but also create a slippery slope 
for state and non-state actors to engage in more pernicious influence activities.  
Similarly, this issue has received negligible attention in the enforcement 
context8––which has largely focused on undisclosed agents or those who make false 
statements to government.9  Within this context, this Article aims to shed new light 
on issues relating to the quality of FARA disclosures by: (1) analyzing the legal 
standards for the level of detail FARA filings disclosing “political activities” of 
foreign agents must adhere to; and (2) studying, through an empirical analysis of 
recent (Exhibit B) filings, whether these standards are adhered to in practice.  
As background to this exercise, Part I briefly outlines the evolving historical 
role of foreign agents in the U.S., while Part II provides a high-level introduction to 
FARA and the obligations under it.  Part III discusses the legal standards governing 
specificity and detail to be adhered to by registrants.  It argues that disclosures 
concerning “political activities” must be “detailed” even though regulations issued 
under FARA10 do not expressly operationalize this standard.  Part IV attempts to 
apply this legal standard to a dataset consisting approximately 140 FARA filings to 
understand trends in compliance, or lack thereof.  Part V concludes by summarizing 
findings and applying these learnings to formulate priority areas for future research, 
study, and reform. 
 
I. FOREIGN AGENTS THROUGH HISTORY: A SNAPSHOT  
 
The roles, as well as perceptions, of foreign agents have evolved with 
changes in government and politics.  Early lobbying efforts in the newly founded U.S. 
centered on issues of general federal (domestic) significance such as tariff legislation, 
railroad construction, industrial development, and treasury matters. However, the 
broadening agenda of Congress contributed to stark increases in the number of 
lobbyists as well as the diversity of issues they sought to represent.11 
Initially though, such agents were employed by governments to assist in the 
conduct of diplomatic relations with foreign states.  For instance, as early as 1786, in 
the “early stages of modern diplomacy,” foreign nationals were appointed to serve as 
agents of the U.S. abroad.  Agents in Morocco were empowered to “act in behalf of 
any American citizen who . . . may have occasion for [their] service, or to transmit to 
[the King of Morocco] . . . any letters or papers from the Congress.”12  Similarly, 
foreign nationals were appointed to represent U.S. interests as consul or consular 
 
8 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION’S 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 8–21 (2016), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1624.pdf.      
9 CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, Criminal Enforcement Summaries, WWW.FARA.US, https://fara.us/criminal-
enforcement-summaries/ (last visited May 15, 2020) (listing recent and historic criminal enforcement actions 
under FARA). 
10 28 C.F.R. §§ 5.1-1101 (2007). 
11 Lobbyists, U.S. SENATE,  
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Byrd_History_Lobbying.htm (last visited May 15, 2020) 
(providing an essay by Sen. Robert C. Byrd delivered on Sep. 28, 1987); see also Robert C. Byrd, History of 
Lobbying: An Essay, 85 CONG. DIG. 130, 130–31 (2006). 
12 Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 88th Cong. 7–8 (1963) [hereinafter Ball Statement] (statement of the Hon. 
George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State). 
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agents abroad, including in Copenhagen (1792–1817), Bremen (1796–1826), and the 
Balearic Islands (1820–1835).13  
Over time, foreign agents assumed roles in the lobbying, public relations, and 
legal spheres.  For instance, agents began to be dispatched to advance U.S. interests 
abroad including pioneering missions to “stir up sentiment against the Anglo-French 
Anti-Slave Trade Treaty,” and influence “European public opinion in favor of the 
Union cause in the Civil War.”14  Parallelly, foreign interests sought to influence 
Congress with notable instances including Canadian lobbying in support of the 
Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, and Russian efforts to lobby through the appropriations 
bill authorizing the payment of the $7,200,000 purchase price for Alaska in 1868.15  
For the most part, these activities — including those conducted by foreign 
agents within the U.S. — were not seen as pernicious.  On the contrary, as later 
acknowledged in State Department testimony before Congress, a foreign agent could 
play beneficial roles: “often serv[ing] as an interpreter of systems and habits of 
thought — as a medium for bridging the gulf of disparate national experiences, 
traditions, institutions, and customs.”16  
However, global conflicts — and their surrounding political currents —
worsened perceptions around the activities of foreign agents in general.  Ultimately, 
Congressional intervention in 1917 was stimulated by reports of English and German 
foreign agents “acting largely with impunity on domestic soil” in the lead up to U.S. 
involvement in World War I in conjunction with concerns that the federal 
counterintelligence machinery at the time was “fragmented and ineffective.”17  As 
part of the resulting Espionage Act, Congress required anyone acting as an agent of a 
foreign government to notify the Secretary of State.  Commonly referred to as the 
Notification Statute18 or “espionage-lite,” this requirement is often confused with 
FARA.19  
In 1938, similar concerns around the activities of Nazi and communist 
propagandists within the U.S. in the interwar period led to the enactment of 
FARA20— the statute central to this Article.  These actors were found to engage in 
propaganda “aimed arbitrarily to group certain American citizens and persons in the 
United States . . . to inculcate [in them] such principles and teachings” so as to 
 
13 Id.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 9; Milton O. Gustafson, Seward’s Bargain: The Alaska Purchase from Russia, PROLOGUE MAG. 
(Winter 1994), https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1994/winter/alaska-check. 
16 Ball Statement, supra note 12, at 11.  
17 John F. Fox Jr., Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence, 1917–18, CIA LIBR. (2005), 
https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-49-no-1/bureaucratic-wrangling-over-
counterintelligence-1917-18/. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 951 (2020) (requiring registration of individuals, other than diplomatic or consular officials, 
acting within the United States as ‘agents of foreign governments’ (defined in 18 U.S.C. § 951(d) (2020)).  See 
also Oversight of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and Attempts to Influence U.S. Elections: Lessons Learned 
from Current and Prior Administrations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(statement of the Honorable Michael Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Just.)  See, in particular, 
response to Question No. 5. 
19 See, e.g., Matthew Kahn, No, Maria Butina Wasn’t Charged With Violating FARA, LAWFARE (Jul. 27, 
2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/no-mariia-butina-wasnt-charged-violating-fara; FARA Related 
Statutes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/fara-related-statutes (last visited May 15, 2020) 
(noting that registration under FARA serves as the requisite notification under 18 U.S.C. § 951). 
20 Ball Statement, supra note 12, at 12; H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 1–2 (1937). 
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influence U.S. policy.21  According to a 1937 Committee Report, “incontrovertible” 
evidence proved that:  
 
[M]any persons in the United States representing foreign 
governments or foreign political groups . . . [were] supplied by 
such foreign agencies with funds and other materials to foster un-
American activities, and to influence the external and internal 
policies of this country . . . .22  
 
Despite these concerns, rather than prohibiting these activities or restricting 
circulation of such material, FARA espoused a disclosure-based approach.  As 
originally enacted, the statute required foreign propagandists to register with the State 
Department23 and make disclosures concerning their activities.24  In this manner, it 
was intended that the government and the American people would know “who are 
engaged in this country by foreign agencies to spread doctrines alien to [the 
American] democratic form of government, or propaganda for the purpose of 
influencing American public opinion on a political question”25 or, in other words, 
“who they were, where the propaganda came from, and who was paying for it.”26  At 
the time of enactment, it was hoped that FARA would focus “the spotlight of pitiless 
publicity”27 on foreign agents and force them to come out “in[to] the open” or subject 
themselves to penalties.28  However, if nothing else, alongside growing U.S. 
prominence in global affairs, the number of foreign agents registered under FARA 
has only increased over time.29 
 
 II. FARA IN THE MODERN CONTEXT  
 
Despite having undergone a significant number of amendments since its 
enactment,30 FARA — as currently in force — continues to emphasize information 
gathering and disclosures over outright prohibition of any foreign agent conduct.31  
At the same time, its focus has since shifted from propaganda and subversive material 
 
21 H.R. REP. NO.75-1381, at 1–2.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 74-153 at 1 (1935) (Report of committee tasked 
with investigating Nazi propaganda); CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45037, THE FOREIGN AGENTS 
REGISTRATION ACT (FARA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45037.pdf. 
22 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 1–2. 
23 Subsequent to comprehensive amendments to FARA in 1942, responsibility for administering and 
implementing the statute was transferred to the Department of Justice.  
24 Foreign Agents Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 75–583, §§ 2–5, 52 Stat. 631, 632–33 (1938). 
25 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2. 
26 Ball Statement, supra note 12, at 10; see also S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 95TH CONG., THE FOREIGN 
AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 1–3 (Comm. Print 1977). 
27 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2. 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 S. REP. NO. 89–143, at 4 (1965) (“Since the Second World War, and particularly since the end of the 
Korean war, U.S. oversea commitments—both political and economic—have grown markedly.  In this same 
period, foreign governments along with foreign political and commercial interests became more active in 
attempting to influence the direction of our policies.”). 
30 BROWN, supra note 21, at 2 (containing a general overview of the amendments to FARA since enactment 
in 1938). 
31 Jacqueline Van De Velde, The “Foreign Agent Problem”: An International Legal Solution to Domestic 
Restrictions on Non-Governmental Organizations, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 687, 700 (2018).  
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to lobbying and political activities conducted by foreign agents.32  In the words of the 
Senate:  
 
The original target of foreign agent legislation––the subversive agent and 
propagandist of pre-World War II days––has been covered by subsequent 
legislation, notably the Smith Act.  The place of the old foreign agent . . . 
has been taken by the lawyer-lobbyist and public relations counsel whose 
object [is not] to subvert or overthrow the U.S. Government, but . . . to 
influence its policies to the satisfaction of his particular client. 33   
 
Subsequent lobbying reforms in the 1990s further restricted the applicability of 
FARA to agents of foreign governments and foreign political parties — with agents 
of other foreign entities (such as corporations) permitted to register under the less-
stringent Lobbying Disclosures Act (“LDA”).34 
The requirements of FARA, in its current form, are facially straightforward.  
Under the statute, agents35 undertaking certain activities on behalf of foreign 
principals,36 are required to register with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)37; engage 
in periodic supplemental filing38; file copies of informational materials they distribute 
on behalf of their principal39; and maintain records of their activities.40  Activities 
which trigger registration and filing requirements for foreign agents include: (1) 
engaging in “political activities”41 as defined by FARA; (2) acting as a public 
relations counsel42; publicity agent,43 information-service employee,44 or political 
consultant45; (3) soliciting, collecting, or disbursing things of value on behalf of a 
 
32 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 95TH CONG., THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 1–3 (Comm. 
Print 1977). 
33 S. REP. NO. 89-143, at 4, 2 (1965) (noting that “the increased tempo of nondiplomatic activity has picked 
up in almost direct proportion to [the United States’] growing political, military, and economic commitments 
around the world”).  
34 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., supra note 26; H.R. REP. NO. 104-339, at 21–22 (1995).  Explaining in 
relation to § 9 of H.R. 2564:  
Under this Section, a lobbyist for a foreign commercial entity is required to register 
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act and a lobbyist for a foreign government or foreign 
political party is required to register under FARA.  With this distinction, agency law as 
currently applied to FARA remains unchanged.  For example, a lobbyist for a foreign 
corporation that is owned by a foreign government will register under the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act, rather than under FARA, so long as the lobbyist’s political activities are 
in furtherance of the bona fide commercial, industrial or financial operations of the 
foreign corporation. 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-339, at 21–22. 
35 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (2020) (defining the term “agent of a foreign principal”). 
36 Id. § 611(b) (defining the term “foreign principal”). 
37 Id. § 612(a) (requiring “agents of foreign principals” to register with the Attorney General by filing a 
complete registration statement along with required supplements thereto). 
38 Id. § 612(b) (requiring “agents of foreign principals” to file half-yearly statements supplementing 
registration statements). 
39 Id. § 614(a). 
40 Id. § 615 (requiring “agents of foreign principals” to keep and preserve books of account and other 
records with respect to activities). 
41 Id. § 611(o).  See also BROWN, supra note 21, at 5. 
42 Id. § 611(g) (defining “public-relations counsel”). 
43 Id. § 611(h) (defining “publicity agent”). 
44 Id. § 611(i) (defining “information-service employee”). 
45 Id. § 611(p) (defining “political consultant”). 
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principal46; and (4) representing foreign principals before federal agencies or 
officials.47  
The primary filings required for covered entities under FARA include: (1) 
registration documents48 consisting of an initial registration statement with necessary 
exhibits (Exhibit A,49 B,50 C,51 and D52), supplemental statements at six-month 
intervals,53 and short form registration statements where applicable54; (2) copies of 
information materials circulated by the agent on behalf of the foreign principal —
whether in printed or other form55; and (3) other (non-periodic) filings including 
amendments to filed documents,56 and conflict provision filings.57       
Certain categories of foreign agents, otherwise covered, are exempt from 
registration and filing requirements under FARA.  These exemptions apply to 
diplomatic and consular officers58 as well as their staff 59; foreign government 
officials 60; persons engaged in private non-political activities in furtherance of trade 
or commerce 61; persons engaged in religious, scholastic, academic, or scientific 
pursuits 62; persons qualified to practice law 63; and agents who have registered under 
the LDA.64 
 
46 Id. § 611(c)(1)(iii). 
47 Id. § 611(c)(1)(iv). 
48 28 C.F.R. §§ 5.200-5.201 (2020) (detailing the filings requirements associated with registration under 
FARA). 
49 Id. § 5.201(a)(1) (detailing that Exhibit A “shall be filed on a form provided by the Registration Unit” 
and “shall set forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal”). 
50 Id. § 5.201(a)(2) (detailing that Exhibit B shall set forth “the agreement or understanding between the 
registrant and each of his foreign principals as well as the nature and method of performance of such agreement 
or understanding and the existing or proposed activities engaged in or to be engaged in, including political 
activities, by the registrant for the foreign principal”). 
51 Id. § 5.201(c). This statute explains that Exhibit C is to be filed by registrants which are organized as 
associations, corporations, organizations, or other combinations and is to consist of: 
(1) A copy of the registrant’s charter, articles of incorporation or association, or 
constitution, and a copy of its bylaws, and amendments thereto; (2) A copy of every other 
instrument or document, and a statement of the terms and conditions of every oral 
agreement, relating to the organization, powers and purposes of the registrant”). 
Id. 
52 Id. § 5.201(e) (detailing that Exhibit D is to be filed “Whenever a registrant, within the United States, 
receives or collects contributions, loans, money, or other things of value, as part of a fund-raising campaign, for 
or in the interests of his foreign principal . . . .”  This statement shall set forth:  
the amount of money or the value of the thing received or collected, the names and 
addresses of the persons from whom such money or thing of value was received or 
collected, and the amount of money or a description of the thing of value transmitted to 
the foreign principal as well as the manner and time of such transmission. 
Id. 
53 Id. § 5.203 (detailing the requirement to file supplemental statements at half-yearly intervals). 
54 Id. § 5.202(a) (detailing the requirement for “partner[s], officer[s], director[s], associate[s], employee[s] 
or agent of a registrant” who does not fall within the exceptions outlined in § 5.202 to file a registration 
statement). 
55 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (2020). 
56 28 C.F.R. § 5.204. 
57 18 U.S.C. § 219 (2020). 
58 22 U.S.C. § 613(a). 
59 Id. § 613(c). 
60 Id. § 613(b). 
61 Id. § 613(d). 
62 Id. § 613(e). 
63 Id. § 613(g). 
64 Id. § 613(h). 
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Within this context, it is clear that FARA historically, as well as in its current 
form, adopts an approach of semi-structured information gathering and disclosure to 
inform stakeholders about the interests represented by foreign agents.  As a corollary, 
it may be inferred that crucial to the successful functioning of the statute are the 
accuracy and comprehensiveness of filings made by covered entities.  If the objective 
of FARA is information symmetry and providing notice of foreign influence efforts, 
it is a precondition that filed materials must be sufficiently detailed so as to actually 
provide effective notice of the identity, interests, and activities of the agent.  Anything 
less would not permit stakeholders to arrive at informed decisions regarding the 
provenance and neutrality of interest groups and materials disseminated by them.65 
Despite the criticality of this requirement, no literature has focused on the 
quality of filings made by foreign agents in relation to the nature, means, and methods 
of their activities.  Towards addressing this gap, this Article will focus on foreign 
agent filings which disclose activities that are “political” in nature, arguably the most 
impactful form of foreign influence activity in general,  and the most harmful if 
unchecked.  Further, following FARA’s 1966 amendments, “political activities” are 
now central to FARA compliance and require the most the most particularized 
disclosures. 
The subsequent parts of this Article will, in the context of “political 
activities,” focus on the law and practice surrounding the level of detail in certain 
FARA filings — enquiring what the legal standard is and, through an empirical lens, 
whether entities comply with these requirements in practice. 
  
III. THE QUESTION OF DETAIL UNDER FARA: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Despite a shift in FARA’s statutory focus, recent enforcement activities 
suggest that FARA remains a key statute intended to check unwelcome forms of 
foreign influence within the U.S.66  Recent concerns regarding foreign interference in 
U.S. elections have only served to reinvigorate interest in the statute and firmly turned 
the spotlight on what was for long considered an arcane67 and poorly-worded68 piece 
of legislation.  
Between 1966 and 2015, the DOJ only brought seven criminal cases under 
FARA.69  However, recent years have seen a “significant uptick” in prosecutions —
including cases against a number of high-profile individuals including Paul Manafort, 
 
65 Ball Statement, supra note 12, at 12.  See also S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 95TH CONG., THE FOREIGN 
AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 1–3 (Comm. Print 1977) (discussing the role of transparency and disclosure in 
countering undue foreign influence). 
66 See, e.g., Joshua R. Fattal, The Justice Department’s New, Unprecedented Use of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, LAWFARE (Dec. 18, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/justice-departments-new-
unprecedented-use-foreign-agents-registration-act (discussing the role of FARA in countering online foreign 
influence and disinformation campaigns). 
67 COVINGTON & BURLING, THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT (“FARA”): A GUIDE FOR THE 
PERPLEXED 2 (2018), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/9251-
theforeignagentsregistrationactfaraaguidefortheper (referring to FARA as arcane and comparing it with the 
“obscure: FCPA). 
68 Nick Robinson, The Foreign Agents Registration Act is Broken, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jul. 22, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/22/the-foreign-agents-registration-act-is-broken/. 
69 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 8, at 8. 
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Michael Flynn, and Richard Gates.70  DOJ leadership has also signaled that it intends 
to further scale up enforcement against foreign influence operations.71  Commentators 
have linked this renewed prioritization to revelations concerning Russian foreign 
influence activities uncovered as part of the Mueller investigation.72 
At the same time, enforcement thus far has largely focused on individuals or 
entities that have failed to register with DOJ. Or, where they have made false 
statements in the course of an investigation.73  DOJ has not brought any enforcement 
actions concerning the level of disclosure or quality of filings made by registrants.  
While this is likely in part due to low prioritization of FARA enforcement in general, 
it is also likely the case that these types of issues are often resolved without resort to 
prosecution.  For instance, DOJ will often allow individuals and entities to amend 
their deficient filings.74 
Alongside being infrequently enforced, FARA has historically been 
subjected to limited scholarly treatment.75  According to a frequently updated law 
firm database, since 1990 and till early 2020, there had been only five academic 
articles written on FARA.76  Most of these focused either on issues of general policy, 
like then-pending FARA amendments, recently enacted amendments,77 or the need 
for statutory reform to address problems like overbroad language, vague terminology, 
and emerging national security threats.78  
 
70 Melissa S. Ho & Andrew T. Fox, Emerging Trend: DOJ Turns to Rarely Used FARA Statute in Recent 
Surge in Prosecutions, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/emerging-trend-
doj-turns-to-rarely-used-fara-statute-recent-surge-prosecutions (last visited May 15, 2020); see also Recent 
FARA Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/recent-cases (last visited May 15, 2020). 
71 Katie Benner, Justice Dept. to Step Up Enforcement of Foreign Influence Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/06/us/politics/fara-task-force-justice-department.html; Theodoric 
Meyer, Van Grack discusses how he’s running the FARA unit, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2019/09/25/van-grack-discusses-how-hes-running-
the-fara-unit-480955. 
72 Zephyr Teachout, How Mueller revived a law that protects us all against foreign money, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/04/17/how-mueller-revived-law-that-protects-
us-all-against-foreign-money/; Meyer, supra note 71. 
73 Ben Freeman, Want to fight foreign influence? Fix FARA filings, THE HILL (Nov. 17, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/470763-want-to-fight-foreign-influence-fix-fara-filings; CAPLIN & 
DRYSDALE, supra note 9 (listing recent and historic criminal enforcement actions under FARA); Tarun 
Krishnakumar, In Absence of Foreign Agents Registration Reform, DOJ Tweaks Could Make a Big Difference, 
JUST SECURITY (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/75589/in-absence-of-foreign-agents-registration-
reform-doj-tweaks-could-make-a-big-difference; CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, Civil Enforcement Summaries, 
WWW.FARA.US, https://fara.us/civil-enforcement-summaries/ (last visited May 15, 2020) (listing recent and 
historic civil enforcement actions under FARA). 
74 28 C.F.R. § 5.204 (2020) (providing in part that an initial, supplemental, or final statement “deemed 
deficient” must be amended upon DOJ request). 
75 Nick Robinson, ‘Foreign Agents’ in an Interconnected World: FARA and the Weaponization of 
Transparency, 69 DUKE L. J. 1075, 1078 (2020). 
76 CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, Other Resources, WWW.FARA.US, https://fara.us/resources/ (last visited May 23, 
2020).  
77 See Mark B. Baker, Updating the Foreign Agents Registration Act to Meet the Current Economic Threat 
to National Security, 25 TEX. INT’L J. 23 (1990); Phillip Perry, Recently Proposed Reforms to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, 23 CORNELL INT’L J. 23 (1990); Charles Lawson, Shining the Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity on 
Foreign Lobbyists Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1151 (1996). 
78 Robinson, supra note 75; see generally Jahad Atieh, Comment, Foreign Agents: Updating FARA to 
Protect American Democracy, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1051 (2010); Perry, supra note 77; Joshua R. Fattal, FARA 
on Facebook, Modernizing the Foreign Agents Registration Act to Address Propagandists on Social Media, 21 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 903 (2019). 
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In contrast, the policy sphere has been much more active in research and 
advocacy around the implementation of FARA.  Organizations including the Project 
on Government Oversight (“POGO”), the Center for Responsive Politics, and the 
Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative (“FITI”) have tracked filings and released 
several reports on FARA compliance.  These reports also serve to highlight the need 
for broader FARA reform.  In particular, FARA’s statutory and enforcement 
deficiencies include: late (or non) filing or mislabeling of information materials, lack 
of enforcement of filing deadlines, and improper disclosures relating to the 
dissemination of informational materials.79  Reports by POGO and FITI have also 
focused on issues like the activities of specific foreign lobbies and the foreign funding 
of think tanks.80  Several organizations also track foreign influence spending and 
FARA-covered activities — providing public datasets and reporting on interesting 
FARA filings.81  While no scholarship has centered on the level of detail contained 
in FARA filings, several experts have flagged the criticality of the issue.82 
Within this context, this Article aims to contribute to the discourse by 
focusing on two main questions concerning FARA filings made by registrants.  First, 
what is the level of detail required to be satisfied by disclosures concerning the 
“political activities” of registrants under FARA?  Second, based on a sample set of 
filings, are there notable trends in the manner in which registered foreign agents 
comply with these requirements?  
In examining these questions, this Article focuses on disclosures of “political 
activities” as contained in Exhibit B filings by foreign agents.  These documents have 
been chosen for several reasons.  At the outset, Exhibit B filings are filed upon the 
initiation of a new foreign agent relationship and are meant to contain “detailed” 
disclosures relating to the activities and “political activities” to be undertaken on 
behalf of the concerned principal.83  These exhibits include details (and, if applicable, 
copies) of the agreement entered into between the registrant and the foreign principal–
including, in most cases, the financial terms.84  This information offers unique 
insights into the nature and dynamics of agent-principal relationships under FARA.  
 
79 BEN FREEMAN & LYDIA DENNETT, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT LOOPHOLES, FILING FAILURES, AND 
LAX ENFORCEMENT: HOW THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT FALLS SHORT (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://www.pogo.org/report/2014/12/loopholes-filing-failures-and-lax-enforcement-how-foreign-agents-
registration-act-falls-short/. 
80 See generally BEN FREEMAN, THE QATAR LOBBY IN WASHINGTON, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y (May 2020), 
https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_eae58acd2c11459894d8e45fbbe1552d.pdf; BEN FREEMAN, FOREIGN 
FUNDING OF THINK TANKS IN AMERICA, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y (Jan. 2020), 
https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_4f06e99f35d4485b801f8dbfe33b6a3f.pdf.  
81 See, e.g., Foreign Lobby Watch, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/fara (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2020); POLITICO: POLITICO INFLUENCE, https://www.politico.com/politicoinfluence/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2020); see also Theodoric Meyer, Cryptic FARA Filing May Spur Questions from DOJ, POLITICO (Sept. 
24, 2019), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-influence/2019/09/24/cryptic-fara-filing-may-spur-
questions-from-doj-480480 (highlighting a deficient filing). 
82 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 73 (noting several deficiencies with the level of detail and transparency 
provided in FARA filings); BEN FREEMAN, THE EMIRATI LOBBY: HOW THE UAE WINS IN WASHINGTON, CTR. 
FOR INT’L POL’Y 3 (Oct. 2019), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/3ba8a1_cc7f1fad2f7a497ba5fb159a6756c34a.pdf?index=true; DARREN E. 
TROMBLAY, POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: HOW FOREIGN ACTORS SEEK TO SHAPE U.S. POLICY MAKING 
208 (2018) (flagging how some registrants provide boilerplate responses on FARA filings). 
83 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
of 1938, as amended (2019) [hereinafter Exhibit B], https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1273636.  
84 Id.  
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Further, Exhibit B filings contain prospective/forward-looking disclosures which 
must, by implication, remain accurate.  Other documents which also contain 
disclosures of “political activities,” such as Supplemental Statements, are 
retrospective.  Therefore, in the initial stages of a foreign agent relationship, the only 
available document which details “political activities” is an Exhibit B filed by a 
registrant.  Lastly, Exhibit B filings have been chosen for their manageable volume 
(per unit time) in comparison to other more frequent filings (such as Supplemental 
Statements) which may also contain insightful disclosures relating to the “political 
activities” of registrants.  
 
A.  LEGAL STANDARD FOR DISCLOSURE OF “POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES”  
 
When FARA was enacted in 1938,85 it did not contain express language 
specifying the level of detail with which activities of registrants were required to be 
disclosed in filings.86  Rather, the statute delegated to the Secretary of State the power 
to prescribe the level of detail with which registrants were required to disclose their 
activities as part of supplemental statements required to be filed every six months.87  
Regulations issued by the State Department in 1939 required that all spaces in the 
registration statement must be filled in — and no “essential detail” be left out.88 
While template forms for Registration and Supplemental Statements 
prescribed alongside these regulations did not provide a specific field or space in 
which the activities of foreign agents were to be detailed,89 they required the registrant 
to provide contracts of employment which were “to indicate in complete detail the 
nature of the employment of registrant and the terms and conditions thereof.”90  While 
co-located regulations issued under Title VIII of the Espionage Act required “a 
detailed statement of the present and proposed activities of such agent,” the import of 
this provision was not further detailed.91 
While FARA has been amended several times since enactment, it was not 
until the 1942 amendments that express provisions relating to disclosures of activities 
of foreign agents were included.  Under the amended FARA, registration statements 
were now also to include a “comprehensive” statement of existing and proposed 
activities of the registrant92 and a “detailed” statement of every registrable activity 
performed by an agent on behalf of himself or any person other than a foreign 
 
85 Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 611 
et seq.). 
86 Under the 1938 FARA, foreign agents were required to disclose details including: (1) their name, 
business address, and residential address; (2) name of the principal or person on whose behalf they were acting 
as agents; (3) copies of all contracts (or statement of terms and conditions, if oral) of employment under which 
such person acts or agrees to act as agent; (4) date of commencement of activities and contract; (5) compensation 
to be paid as well as names of all foreign principals contributing to such contribution; and (6) charter documents 
of registrant, if applicable.  Id. § 2. 
87 Id. § 3(c). 
88 Foreign Principals and Foreign Governments, Registration of Agents, 4 Fed. Reg. 3940, 3942 (Sept. 16, 
1939) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 5). 
89 Id. § 24.5 (noting the Format of Registration Statement at § 24.3). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. § 24.29. 
92 Foreign Agents Registration Act, ch. 263, sec. 233, § 2(a)(4), 56 Stat. 248, 252.  
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principal.93  In contrast to the 1939 Regulations, new regulations issued under the 
amended FARA in 1942 did not contain specific provisions relating to the disclosures 
of activities of agents––barring that registrants were required to file Exhibit C forms 
which were to contain details of their activities on behalf of foreign principals.94 
As discussed in the previous Section, the 1966 Amendments to FARA were 
responsible for shifting the focus of the statute from propaganda and subversion to 
political activities and lobbying.  With this shift, it is unsurprising that these 
amendments also introduced the concept of “political activities” to FARA.95  Notably, 
these amendments also amended FARA to require a “detailed” statement of “political 
activities” performed by the registrant on behalf of the principal –– to be filed as part 
of registration statements.96  Similar provisions requiring “detailed” statements were 
included in relation to expenditures of registrants in connection with the foreign 
principal representation,97 and registrable activities of agents performed on behalf of 
themselves or persons other than foreign principals.98  Regulations issued in 1967 
pursuant to these amendments, for the very first time, provided additional clarity on 
the legal standard for activity-related disclosures.  Section 5.210 of the regulations99 
–– which remains unamended till date –– provided as follows: 
 
A statement is “detailed” within the meaning of clauses 6 and 8 of section 
2(a) of the Act when it has that degree of specificity necessary to permit 
meaningful public evaluation of each of the significant steps taken by a 
registrant to achieve the purposes of the agency relation.  
 
Notably, this definition – as is clear from its text – only applied to the use of the term 
“detailed” in relation to agent expenditures (FARA § 2(a)(8))100 and registrable 
activities of agents performed on behalf of themselves or persons other than foreign 
principals (FARA § 2(a)(6)).101  Despite a requirement being included for “detailed” 
statements to be filed in relation to the “political activities” of agents in 1966 (FARA 
§ 2(a)(4)),102 the definition of “detailed” included in section 5.210 does not expressly 
 
93 Id. § 2(a)(6). 
94 Forms, Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 7 Fed. Reg. 4717, 4719 (Jun. 25, 1942) 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 5). 
95 Act to Amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (amending 
FARA and adding the definition of “political activities” at section 1(o)). 
96 Id. § 2(3) (providing in relation to Section 2 of FARA: “Subsection (a)(4) is amended by inserting before 
the semicolon at the end thereof a comma and the following: ‘including a detailed statement of any such activity 
which is a political activity.’”) (emphasis added). 
97 Id. § 2(6) (amending FARA § 2(a)(8)). 
98 Id. § 2(4) (amending FARA § 2(a)(6)). 
99 Administration and Enforcement of Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 ((as amended at 32 Fed. 
Reg. 6362, 6364 (Apr. 22, 1967)) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 5.210 (2020)) (emphasis added). 
100 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(8) (2020). 
101 Id. § 612(a)(6). 
102 Id. § 612(a)(4). This statute requires that:  
[c]opies of each written agreement and the terms and conditions of each oral agreement, 
including all modifications of such agreements, or, where no contract exists, a full 
statement of all the circumstances, by reason of which the registrant is an agent of a 
foreign principal; a comprehensive statement of the nature and method of performance of 
each such contract, and of the existing and proposed activity or activities engaged in or 
to be engaged in by the registrant as agent of a foreign principal for each such foreign 
principal, including a detailed statement of any such activity which is a political activity. 
Id. 
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extend to cover statements under this requirement.  This raises questions relating to 
the level of detail with which “political activities” of foreign agents are required to be 
disclosed.  For the reasons below, it is submitted that the same meaning of “detailed” 
provided in section 5.210 of the regulations (extracted above) must be ascribed to the 
term “detailed statements” under § 2(a)(4) of FARA as well. 
 
i.  Same Words Within a Statute to be Construed Similarly  
 
At the outset, it may be noted that the same word “detailed” has been used 
within FARA on multiple occasions – i.e., within §§ 2(a)(4), 2(a)(6), and 2(a)(8) – to 
describe the nature of statements required to be filed under each of these provisions.  
It is a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that “identical words used in 
different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the same meaning.”103  
While the application of this principle can be defeated by demonstrating that 
the context of usage of the similar words was different,104 this rebuttal is not attracted 
in relation to the use of “detailed” in the present context.  In the context of FARA, the 
word “detailed” has only ever been used as a prefix to the word “statement” and only 
in the context of describing the quality of filings to be made by registrants under the 
statute.  Not only is the context similar, it is identical.  
Therefore, it cannot stand to reason that the context of usage is different.  
Consequently, the presumption of consistent usage stands and “detailed” as used in § 
2(a)(4) must be interpreted and construed in the same manner in which it is used 
within §§ 2(a)(6) and 2(a)(8). 
 
ii.  Legislative Intent Supports This Interpretation  
 
The use of legislative history to support statutory interpretation by courts is, 
to say the least, controversial.105  Notwithstanding rising acceptance of legislative 
history, critics point to political, theoretical, and practical problems posed by reliance 
on such material.106  Despite these criticisms, there is broad agreement that legislative 
history can play a role in purposes other than establishing “legislative intent,” such as 
 
103 Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. 639, 643, (2014) (“Generally, identical words used in different parts 
of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the same meaning” (quoting Merrill Lynch et al. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 
71, 86, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006))); IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 33 (2005) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory 
interpretation that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the 
same meaning.  E.g., Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484, 110 S. Ct. 2499, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990).”); 
VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND 
TRENDS 57 (2018); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 170 (2012).  
104 LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
AND RECENT TRENDS 15-16 (2014) (“The general presumption is not rigid, however, and ‘readily yields when 
there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion 
that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.’” [Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. 
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1933).  See also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1997)].  
Context and statutory history can override the presumption.”).  
105 See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 103, at 369–90 (2012).  
106 Id. at 375. 
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for “establishing linguistic usage” when the text of a statute is unclear or 
ambiguous.107 
In the context of FARA, the application of these principles to discern the 
meaning of “detailed” is unlikely to be affected by the above criticisms.  The Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on the Judiciary, in 
largely identical reports, while commenting on § 2(6) of the 1966 amendment,108 
which sought to amend FARA § 2(a)(8), stated that the inclusion of the language 
mandating “detailed statements” was intended to require “that degree of specificity 
necessary to permit meaningful public evaluation of each of the significant steps taken 
to achieve the purposes of the agency.”109  Crucially, both Committees clearly stated 
that this meaning not only extended to “detailed statements” under § 2(6) but also 
other subsections where the same language was used.110 
In summary, legislative materials that preceded the passage of the 1966 
Amendments which introduced the requirement for “detailed” statements not only 
provided guidance on what the term was supposed to mean but also clearly stated that 
this meaning applied to all instances (i.e. provisions) where the defined term was 
used.  Following on, the adoption of this definitional language verbatim by the DOJ 
in § 5.210 of the regulations (which is identical to the Committee’s language above) 
clinches the issue.  Where the DOJ has issued interpretative regulations identical to 
pre-enactment language, and where such pre-enactment language was expressly 
intended to consistently apply across all uses of “detailed statement,” it is clear that 
“detailed statement” as used in § 2(a)(4) of FARA must be given the same meaning 
enumerated in § 5.210 of the regulations. 
 
B.  “DETAILED STATEMENTS”: THE LEGAL STANDARD  
 
The above sections demonstrate that there are strong arguments why 
“detailed” as used in § 2(a)(4) in relation to “political activities” must be accorded the 
same interpretation taken by the DOJ in relation to §§ 2(a)(6) and 2(a)(8) of FARA.  
Therefore, under the status quo, it is clear that statements disclosing “political 
activities” of registrants under FARA must be sufficiently detailed so as to permit 
meaningful public evaluation of the significant steps taken by the registrant on behalf 
of the foreign principal to achieve the objectives of the latter. 
However, this standard does not stand alone as regards disclosures relating 
to the nature of activities of foreign agents.  Even without having to engage in the 
above interpretational exercise, § 2(a)(4) provides layered disclosure requirements 
which would regardless have to be satisfied.  For instance, over and above requiring 
 
107 Id. at 388.  See, e.g., Carrieri v. Jobs.com, Inc., 393 F.3d 508, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Only after 
application of the principles of statutory constructions, including the canons of construction, and after a 
conclusion that the statute is ambiguous may the court turn to the legislative history.”). 
108 Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966) (amending FARA). 
109 S. REP NO. 89-143, at 10 (1965); H.R. REP No. 89-1470, at 9 (1966). 
110 S. REP NO. 89-143, at 10 (1965); H.R. REP No. 89-1470, at 9.  Both reports state as follows:  
The phrase “a detailed statement,” as used in this subsection (as well as in a number of 
others in section 2) is intended by the committee to require that degree of specificity 
necessary to permit meaningful public evaluation of each of the significant steps taken to 
achieve the purposes of the agency. 
S. REP NO. 89-143, at 10 (1965); H.R. REP No. 89-1470, at 9.   
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“detailed” statements in relation to “political activities,” this provision requires “a 
comprehensive statement of the nature and method of performance of each [principal-
agent] contract and of the existing and proposed activity or activities engaged in or to 
be engaged in by the registrant as the agent of a foreign principal for each such foreign 
principal.”111  Seemingly applying to all activities to be conducted by an agent on 
behalf of a foreign principal, this is a broader requirement than which applies to 
“political activities.”  While the rules of statutory interpretation will likely require 
that “political activities” be disclosed as per the higher “detailed” standard,112 even if 
such a standard were not present, these activities — at very least — would likely have 
to be described in “comprehensive” terms as required under § 2(a)(4). 
 
III. THE QUESTION OF DETAIL UNDER FARA: EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES  
 
The above Section sought to provide insight into the legal standard that 
disclosures concerning “political activities” must adhere to under FARA.  It 
concluded that “political activities” must be disclosed in a manner that is specific 
enough to permit meaningful public evaluation of each of the “significant steps” taken 
by the registrant on behalf of the foreign principal to achieve the objectives of the 
representation.  
While there is no further statutory or executive guidance on what this 
standard means in practice, its textual formulation indicates that it requires that, in 
relation to “political activities,” disclosures must, at a minimum: (1) be specific; (2) 
indicate what the objective of the representation is; (3) detail each significant steps 
taken by the registrant towards such objective; and (4) in general, be of such a nature 
that they are meaningful to members of the public who wish to evaluate them.  This 
legal standard is broadly tracked by Question (or Form Field) No. 10 of the Exhibit 
B form,113 which requires a description of “all such political activities indicating, 
among other things, the relations, interests or policies to be influenced together with 
the means to be employed to achieve this purpose.”114  Similarly, the requirement of 
§ 2(a)(4) to provide a comprehensive statement of registrant activities is broadly 
tracked by Questions 8 and 9 of Exhibit B, which require registrants to describe fully 
“the nature and method of performance of the above indicated agreement or 
understanding” and “the activities the registrant engages in or proposes to engage in 
on behalf of the above foreign principal,” respectively.115  
This Section attempts to supplement this understanding with an empirical 
analysis of a sample set of Exhibit B filings made by registrants.  The objective of 
this exercise is to serve as a marker for future research and study by considering trends 
in compliance with the above standards among others — or, alternatively, the lack 
thereof. 
 
111 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(4) (2020). 
112 28 C.F.R. § 5.210 (2020). 
113 Certain registrants have made filings in the format provided by Form NSD-4 (Revised 05/17), and 
others have used the format provided by Form NSD-4 (Revised 06/19).  In the former, political activity 
disclosures are sought at Question 9 and not 10.  For the purposes of this paper, the numbering used in the later 
form will be used as standard. 
114 Exhibit B, supra note 83, at Question 10. 
115 Id. at Questions 8 and 9. 
  




A.  OVERVIEW OF DATASET  
 
In order to conduct this analysis, the following sections consider a dataset of 
Exhibit B filings received by the DOJ between December 1, 2019, and March 31, 
2020.  Extracted directly from the DOJ FARA eFile portal, this includes around 140 
documents categorized as “Exhibit A/B” filings by the filing system.  However, as 
noted below, documents categorized as “Exhibit A/B” filings often do not include the 
Exhibits themselves — sometimes containing bare agreements or other mislabeled 
documents. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY  
 
While the primary focus of this paper is on the “political activities” of foreign 
agents, the present analysis is not restricted to the fields which specifically require 
registrants to disclose such activities. This is due to the fact that details of “political 
activities” may be dispersed over various fields of an Exhibit B filing.  Therefore, in 
order to analyze the quality of disclosures made by agents in Exhibit B filings, it is 
necessary to consider fields apart from Question 10 of Exhibit B (which specifically 
pertains to “political activities”).  Consequently, this Section focuses on the following 
fields within Exhibit B forms: 
 
(1) Format of agreement between the registrant and foreign principal:116  This 
field concerns whether the agreement is based on a “formal written contract,” 
“exchange of correspondence,” or neither.  An example of the last category 
may be an oral agreement not reduced to writing.  In addition to format, 
where relevant or anomalous, this head will also include consideration of 
characteristics such as contract length and execution status. 
 
(2) Nature and method of performance of the agreement:117  This field requires 
details relating to the terms of the agreement between the registrant and 
foreign principal.  As there is no express guidance about what must be 
included within this field that is not part of (3) below, the two fields are 
considered together [Question 8]. 
 
(3) Activities registrant proposed to engage in on behalf of the principal:118  This 
field requires “full” details of the activities the registrant engages in or 
proposes to engage in on behalf of the foreign principal [Question 9]. 
 
(4) Political Activities:119  This field requires confirmation of whether the 
activities proposed to be undertaken by the agent on behalf of the foreign 
principal include “political activities.”  If the response to this prompt is yes, 
 
116 Id. at Questions 4, 5, and 6. 
117 Id. at Question 8. 
118 Id. at Question 9. 
119 Id. at Question 10. 
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a detailed description of such activities is required to be provided [Question 
10].120 
 
(5) Miscellaneous: In addition to the substantive/qualitative information that 
may be provided in the fields above, where relevant, this Section will 
consider issues such as whether entries to Exhibit B are direct responses or 
references to other documents (“directness” of responses) and whether 
entries to Exhibit B form fields are legible.  In addition, it will also consider 




While the dataset of filings studied for the present analysis is small in relation 
to the total number of FARA filings available, it is not so small as to prevent the 
drawing of broad conclusions relating to trends in Exhibit B filings.  Further, it is 
important to note that the dataset considered relates to filings made subsequent to the 
recent spike in FARA enforcement activity (and prior to the majority of the COVID-
19 pandemic).  Therefore, any observations relating to non-compliance with statutory 
provisions are likely to be an underestimation of similar trends in relation to the 
broader dataset. 
At the same time, it may be noted that the likely remedy for insufficiently 
detailed filings would be a notice from the DOJ, which, at best, may require 
registrants to remedy deficiencies.121  Given the infrequency of FARA enforcement 
and––as the analysis below will provide, at best, a rough overview of––the scale of 
the problem, these factors may operate to question the very foundational assumptions 
of FARA, i.e., that transparency and disclosures can help counter the effects of foreign 
influence activities.  In other words, if filings are habitually deficient, the risk of DOJ 
scrutiny is low, and the remedial measures––at the first instance––are minimal, valid 
questions may be asked of the adequacy of the approach taken by FARA as a whole.  
It is within this limited context that the following analysis must be viewed. 
 
i. Agreement  
 
This Section considers non-substantive characteristics relating to Exhibit B 
filings––including nature of filings, medium, and completeness from a procedural 
perspective.  Rather than the substance of filings, it focuses on issues relating to form 
and format.  An analysis of these considerations is important as non-substantive 
 
120 If a registrant discloses political activities, it must 
describe all such political activities indicating, among other things, the relations, interests 
or policies to be influenced together with the means to be employed to achieve this 
purpose.  The response must include, but not be limited to, activities involving lobbying, 
promotion, perception management, public relations, economic development, and 
preparation or dissemination of informational materials. 
Id. at Question 10. (emphasis added).  
121 U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., supra note 8, at 8–21 (noting at various points that the National Security Division 
of the Department of Justice preferred to pursue registration (and voluntary compliance) rather than 
prosecution). 
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factors can also have a significant impact on the ability of the public to meaningfully 
evaluate the activities of a foreign agent. 
Format.  While the total number of documents labelled as Exhibit B filings 
on the FARA database that were analyzed was 143, only 120 of these actually 
contained Exhibit B forms.  Of these, the vast majority of Exhibit B filings––95 out 
of 120––pertained to principal-agent relationships that had been reduced into written 
contractual arrangements.122  At the same time, the titling, format, and nature of these 
agreements varied widely and included one or two-page engagement letters,123 letters 
of appointment,124 services contracts,125 special “Foreign Agent Written 
Agreements”126 and other forms of agreements.  Similarly, the length of contracts 
included as annexures varied from single-page agreements to complex contracts as 
long as 38127 and 261 pages.128  In cases where the agreements were of such lengths, 
there was no specific correlation observed in relation to the detail with which the 
registrant described its activities within Exhibit B.  This raises the question of whether 
filings of excessive length act to aid or hurt the ability of third parties to meaningfully 
evaluate the activities at issue.  Further, as the following sections demonstrate, the 
fact that a relationship is reduced into contractual form does not guarantee that 
sufficient detail is provided.  
In the minority of filings, 25 out of 120, agreements were not in specific 
written contractual form.  These included cases where the agreement consisted of 
exchange of correspondence129 (5 of 120) and other non-written (or oral) 
arrangements (20 of 120).130  In addition to the above, 29 out of 143 documents 
categorized as Exhibit B filings on the FARA database also pertained to existing 
representations and covered issues including renewals,131 extensions,132 
 
122 Exhibit B forms where registrants had indicated, through responding in the affirmative to Question 4, 
have been considered as written agent relationships for the purpose of this analysis. 
123 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Qatar (Dec. 17, 2019), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6771-Exhibit-AB-
20191217-1.pdf. 
124 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, DPWorld FZE (Dec. 30, 2019) [hereinafter DPWorld FZE], 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6200-Exhibit-AB-20191230-13.pdf. 
125 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International 
Information Agency (Jan. 15, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6490-Exhibit-AB-20200115-3.pdf. 
126 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Hmong Kingdom ChaoFa State (Mar. 16, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6800-Exhibit-AB-20200316-1.pdf. 
127 See, e.g., DPWorld FZE, supra note 124.      
128 See, e.g., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Department for International Trade, Government of the United Kingdom (Feb. 24, 
2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6795-Exhibit-AB-20200224-1.pdf. 
129 Exhibit B forms where registrants had indicated, through responding in the affirmative to Question No. 
5, have been considered as being concluded by exchange of correspondence for the purpose of this analysis. 
130 Exhibit B forms where registrants had indicated, through responding in the affirmative to Question No. 
6, have been considered as being concluded through oral or non-written arrangements for the purpose of this 
analysis. 
131 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Embassy of the Republic of Korea (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6401-Exhibit-AB-20200228-13.pdf. 
132 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Embassy of Qatar (Mar. 25, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6561-
Exhibit-AB-20200325-3.pdf. 
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supplements,133 terminations,134 and amendments.135  Seven of these 29 consisted of 
bare documents–unaccompanied by an Exhibit B form or a covering letter.  This lack 
of contextual documents can be expected to not only complicate the meaningful 
evaluation of filings but may also amount to a violation of FARA regulations.136  
Completeness.  In all but two cases, where parties had indicated that 
principal-agent agreements were in written form, the referenced contractual 
documents were appended to the Exhibit B form.  Further, in almost all cases — 112 
of 120 documents — where Exhibit B forms were present, the agreements in question 
had been executed by both parties prior to filing with the DOJ.  However, in at least 
3 out of 120 cases, executed agreements were of a boilerplate nature with specific 
services being detailed in appendices or annexures that were not signed by the 
parties.137 
In contrast, where an Exhibit B filing pertained to an existing arrangement 
(i.e., was a renewal, amendment, supplement, etc.), in all but 2 out of these 29 cases, 
the filings only included or referred to the new or amended terms.  In other words, 
they did not either provide details relating to or attach a copy of the underlying 
agreements.138 
Similarly, in one case where an existing representation was amended by an 
exchange of correspondence, it was observed that key attachments referred to in the 
email correspondence were not filed alongside the emails in which they were 
referenced.139  
A concerning trend related to open-ended or framework agreements which 
provided that the specific activities to be performed for the foreign principal would 
be determined on the basis of separate/independent statements of work to be executed 
subsequently.140  In the cases that adopted this approach, there was no evidence that 
 
133 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Consulate General of Japan (NY) (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6289-Exhibit-AB-20200227-14.pdf. 
134 See, e.g., Letter from Christopher M. Kise, Foley & Lardner LLP, to Reinaldo Munoz Pedrova, Attorney 
General (Feb. 7, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6787-Exhibit-AB-20200208-2.pdf.  
135 See, e.g., Dep’t. of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Nizami Ganjavi International Center (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6587-Exhibit-AB-20200117-2.pdf.  
136 28 C.F.R. § 5.207(a) (2020) (providing that each initial, supplemental, and final statement shall be 
“complete in and of itself” and prohibiting incorporation of information by reference to statements previously 
filed) (emphasis added). 
137 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (through MSLGROUP Americas, LLC 
d/b/a Qorvis Communications) (Mar. 3, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6801-Exhibit-AB-20200318-1.pdf.  
138 For an example of a filing where the underlying agreement was not attached, see Dep’t of Just., Dubai 
Tourism and Commerce Marketing and Edelman FZ LLC (Feb. 18, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/3634-
Exhibit-AB-20200218-77.pdf (notably this example consists only of the contract amendment and does not 
include a covering letter or form). 
139 Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Consulate General of Japan (NY) (Mar. 19, 2020), 
http://www.fara.gov/docs/6289-Exhibit-AB-20200319-15.pdf.  This filing refers to an exchange of 
correspondence as the basis for a supplemental agreement.  While an email chain has been enclosed, key 
documents stated to be attached to the email chain have not been provided as part of the same document.  Id. 
140 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Low Taek Jho (Jan. 22, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6642-Exhibit-
AB-20200122-3.pdf. 
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parties had actually filed subsequent statements of work or sub-contracts with the 
DOJ.  
Contractual Terms.  What varied with the form of the agreement was also 
the level of detail with which the contracts themselves described the nature of services 
provided by the agent to the foreign principal.  In this regard, some agreements made 
no mention of the specific services being offered,141 others provided a detailed list of 
services — but did not mention the issue or objective underlying the provision of 
services,142 while some provided detailed disclosures on both counts.143  The level of 
detail with which contracts discuss agent activities and duties assumes relevance as 
several filings merely made references to the contract instead of providing responses 
to questions including Questions 8 through 10.  This issue is addressed in more detail 
below.  
Legibility.  Another criterion that was considered in relation to the filings was 
legibility of the entries in question.  Within this context, none of the documents 
included within the dataset of 120 Exhibit B forms suffered from significant legibility 
concerns.  However, in at least two cases the text filled into various form fields was 
of a degraded quality and difficult to read.144  Even such text had been recognized 
through OCR and could be digitally selected and copied.  It is expected that older 
FARA filings may suffer from more significant legibility-related concerns.  
 
ii. Nature & Method of Performance of Agreement & Activities to be 
Undertaken on Behalf of Principal  
 
Unlike the Section above, which focused on trends in non-substantive 
characteristics of Exhibit B filings, this Section briefly considers responses to 
Questions 8 and 9 of Exhibit B.  At the same time, responses to these questions are 
not the primary focus of this paper.  This is as, unlike “political activities,” there is no 
express legal standard to which disclosures under these fields must conform, and the 
DOJ provides no detailed in-form guidance on what responses to these queries must 
contain.145  Despite this, a preliminary study of responses to these questions reveals 
several interesting trends.  
 
141 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Komala Representation in the US (Feb. 24, 2020), 
http://www.fara.gov/docs/6639-Exhibit-AB-20200224-3.pdf (the engagement letter provided only indicates that 
the registrant will provide the Client “government affairs and media relations services and will agree with it on 
a work plan.”  No further indication of specific activities or issues is provided); Dep’t of Just., Annexure to 
Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 
Political Union of Citizens “Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia” (Feb. 12, 2020) [hereinafter Georgian 
Dream – Democratic Georgia], http://www.fara.gov/docs/6278-Exhibit-AB-20200212-16.pdf (despite 
providing a detailed standard form contract, the agreement only obliquely indicates that the registrant will 
provide “public affairs professional services” to the client.  No further details are provided).  
142 Georgian Dream – Democratic Georgia, supra note 141.  
143 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Reinaldo Munoz Pedroza, Attorney General, Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (Mar. 20, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6325-Exhibit-AB-20200320-2.pdf (providing a detailed 
agreement with clearly specified policy objectives and proposed activities). 
144 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Annexure to Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938, as amended,  Turkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6780-Exhibit-AB-20200312-1.pdf. 
145 In the absence of form-level guidance, the general standard laid down in 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(4) likely 
will apply in relation to both fields. 
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The overarching theme of these trends is inconsistency and confusion.  First, 
this is best exemplified by the varying approaches of registrants in responding to 
Question 8 of the Exhibit B form.  While some registrants used this field to describe 
the terms of agreements entered into with their foreign principals, most provided a 
general description of the activities proposed to be undertaken on behalf of the 
principal or the issues/interests sought to be represented.  For instance, a filing by a 
registrant, in response to Question 8 outlined the objective of the representation 
(“Promote LISCR's interest with United States stakeholders and agencies, particularly 
relating to maritime industry related matters impacting the Liberian Registry”)146 
while others detailed the activities to be performed for the benefit of the foreign 
principal147 or described the contractual arrangements.148  
Second, a comparison of responses to Questions 8 and 9 of Exhibit B also 
supports the overarching theme of inconsistency.  In at least sixteen of the forms 
analyzed, registrants adopted a “copy-paste” approach — reproducing identical 
statements in response to both questions.149  At best, this demonstrates that parties are 
not clear about the requirements of each field.  At worst, this trend is indicative of 
parties showing wanton indifference in providing answers that are responsive to the 
prompts of the Exhibit B form. 
While Question 8 provides little guidance on what is expected from 
registrants, Question 9 is somewhat clearer.  Here, registrants are required to 
“describe fully the activities the registrant engages in or proposes to engage in on 
behalf of the above foreign principal.”150  While there is no guidance on how much 
detail is required to be included in this field, it at least must be “full” or 
“comprehensive.”151  However, in at least half of the 120 filings, the description of 
 
146 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, LISCR, LLC Q. No. 8 (Feb. 14, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-
20200214-15.pdf. 
147 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Ivanyan and Partners Question 8 (Feb. 13, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6793-
Exhibit-AB-20200213-1.pdf. Responding to Question 8 by stating:  
Provide written quarterly reports that summarize current events-all source materials are publicly 
available.  Source materials include periodicals such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Roll Call, 
and the Wall Street Journal; documents provided by congressional committees (statements, supporting 
materials); subscription services (BGov, Politico Pro, Reuters) and think tank documents (Atlantic 
Council, Brookings, CAP, CATO, etc.).  
148 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, 342 Association (Feb 6, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6791-Exhibit-AB-
20200206-3.pdf (last visited May 22, 2020) (“This agreement is between Registrant and 342 Association for the 
provision of public affairs and communications strategy consulting services.  The term of the agreement is 
September 18, 2019 through October 17, 2019.  Accordingly, Registrant's representation of 342 Association 
ended on October 17, 2019, and the registration of Registrant and all short-form registrants should be terminated.  
342 Association has paid Registrant 50% of the project fee under the agreement; the final payment for the 
remaining 50% is due and expected soon.”).  
149 Registrants have used general language like “Registrant will provide strategic consulting services, 
including representation before the U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, and U.S. executive branch 
agencies” in response to all three questions.  Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(through RJI Capital Corporation) (Feb. 7, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6774-Exhibit-AB-20200207-2.pdf. 
 
150 Exhibit B, supra note 83.  
151 In the absence of form-level guidance, the general standard laid down in 22 U.S.C. § 612(a)(4) likely 
will apply in relation to both fields. 
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registrant activities provided was clearly insufficient by any standard of 
measurement.  In one egregious instance, a registrant disclosed a non-written 
arrangement merely describing it as “[m]edia consulting, strategic communications, 
writing and editing” with no further details on the specific activities or issues to be 
addressed as part of the representation.152       
In addition, as indicated above, many responses to Question 9 were verbatim 
reproduction of Question 8 responses.  Unsurprisingly, most of these would also not 
likely amount to full or comprehensive disclosures of registrant activities.153  In 
general, it was also observed that limited representations — for example, in relation 
to a particular event or trip — were less problematic in terms of disclosure.154      
Lastly, several filings also declined to answer Question 9 directly — instead, 
directing readers to refer to the appendix (typically, the attached contract) for 
information on registrant activities.  While it is unclear if such incorporation by 
reference would stymie meaningful public inquiry in all cases, there were multiple 
cases where such references were red herrings.  In these cases, the contracts 
themselves were silent on the nature of the engagement, did not detail registrant 
activities, or contained information otherwise unresponsive to Question 9.  For 
instance, in one example, the registrant stated “See attached contract for details of 
agreement” in response to Questions 7 through 9 (numbering different due to older 
NSD-4 form being used).  However, the attached contract was also bereft of any 
details relating to the arrangement apart from the fact that the registrant was to “advise 
and place paid media” (sic) for the client.155  In contrast, in some other cases, contracts 
were comprehensive and provided detailed terms relating to the activities to be 
conducted by the registrant.156 
 
iii.  Political Activities Disclosures  
 
Unlike the responses to Questions 8 and 9, there is arguably a clearer legal 
standard to which disclosures of the “political activities” of a registrant must conform 
(Question 10).  As suggested in the previous Section, these must be “detailed,” i.e., 
reflect “that degree of specificity necessary to permit meaningful public evaluation of 
 
152 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United States of America (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6789-Exhibit-AB-20200131-1.pdf. 
153 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Dr. Reginald Boulos (Jan. 27, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6788-Exhibit-AB-
20200130-1.pdf (providing identical vague responses to Questions 8 and 9: “Consultant to provide advice to 
Client relating to political strategy, public relations, and Client's government relations with the governments of 
Haiti and the United States . . .”). 
154 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Confindustria (Dec. 8, 2019), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6764-Exhibit-AB-20191208-
1.pdf; Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Davor Stier (Dec. 2, 2019), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6759-Exhibit-AB-20191202-4.pdf 
(“Registrant unsuccessfully attempted to schedule an informal meeting with White House staff on behalf of the 
foreign principal . . . .”). 
155 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Terra Peregrin S.A (Jan. 10, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6399-Exhibit-AB-20200110-
34.pdf. 
156 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Republic of Turkey (Feb. 3, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6328-Exhibit-AB-
20200203-11.pdf (despite the Exhibit B filing itself being bereft of details, the attached contract is detailed). 
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each of the significant steps taken to achieve the purposes of the agency.”157  While 
the exact contours of what this entails are not settled, several conclusions can be 
drawn from a bare perusal of this standard. At a minimum, disclosure must, with 
specificity, disclose the purposes of the agency as well as each of the significant steps 
proposed to achieve them.  For the purposes of the present analysis, this is the standard 
broadly relied upon. 
In relation to the present dataset, of the 120 Exhibit B forms considered, 91 
indicated that they involved the registrant engaging in activities of a “political” 
nature.  A study of these disclosures indicated two types of broad issues — those 
relating to accuracy of the disclosure, and those relating to the level of detail. 
Accuracy.  The issue of accuracy concerns whether the categorization of 
activities of the registrant as “political” is accurate.  This issue assumes significance 
as no further disclosures are required from registrants who respond that they are not 
engaging in “political activities.”  In contrast, as per the Question 10 prompt, a 
registrant engaging in “political activities” is required to “describe all such political 
activities indicating, among other things, the relations, interests or policies to be 
influenced together with the means to be employed to achieve this purpose.”158  
Further, as per the prompt, “[t]he response must include, but not be limited to, 
activities involving lobbying, promotion, perception management, public relations, 
economic development, and preparation and dissemination of informational 
materials.”159 
Of the ninety-one Exhibit B forms which indicated that registrants sought to 
engage in “political activities,” in at least twelve cases, there were concerns that the 
categorization of the activities of the registrant may have been inaccurate.  Based 
solely on materials and statements made by the registrants themselves in their filings, 
in at least ten of these cases, registrants who disclosed that they were not engaged in 
“political activities” seem to have miscategorized their activities.  In some cases, the 
categorization of activities as non–political were egregious and had glaring errors.  
For instance, in one case, a registrant who described its activities as “[b]uilding 
relationships with members of congress and staff” declared that it was not engaging 
in “political activities.”160  
Less commonly, in a few cases, the inverse was observed, with registrants 
seemingly erroneously classifying clearly non–political activities as political in 
nature.  For instance, it is unlikely that a registrant who — as per form-provided data 
— only engages in monitoring of public domain sources, would be found to engage 
in a “political activity” under FARA.161  
Completeness and Detail.  Analysis under this heading involved studying 
cases where registrants indicated that they intended to engage in “political activities” 
 
157 S. REP NO. 89-143, at 10 (1965).  
158 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Question 10 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara/page/file/1235221/download. 
159 Id.  
160 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Feb. 6, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6790-Exhibit-AB-
20200206-1.pdf. 
161 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Ivanyan and Partners, Question 8 (Feb. 13, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6793-Exhibit-
AB-20200213-1.pdf. 
  
68   Journal of Legislation [Vol. 47:2] 
 
 
and the level of detail in which they responded to Question 10 of the Exhibit B form.  
Based on the criteria discussed above, where a registrant did not clearly disclose the 
interests or issues it sought to influence or provide details relating to the manner in 
which it sought to influence such issues, it was considered that the filing did not meet 
the requisite standard of detail required under FARA.  This analysis revealed several 
notable trends. 
At the outset, it is worth mentioning the manner in which registrants sought 
to describe their “political activities.”  Of the ninety-one registrants who disclosed 
“political activities,” the vast majority (at least eighty-six) attempted to directly 
respond to the question within the template form.  The remaining registrants tried to 
respond by attempting to refer to an attached contract162 or, in one case, a previously 
filed Exhibit B form.163  Unlike in relation to Questions 8 and 9 above, this approach 
is less likely to pass muster under Question 10, given the higher legal standard for 
detail applicable to disclosure of “political activities.” In many cases, the contracts 
referred to did not contain any information responsive to the prompts in Exhibit B.164  
At the same time, there were examples of cases where registrants provided 
insufficient details in direct response to Question 10, but where the attached 
contractual agreement addressed these gaps through detailed disclosures concerning 
the scope of the representation.165 
Similar to observations made in relation to Questions 8 and 9 of the Exhibit 
B form, several registrants adopted a “copy–paste” approach to Question 10 —
choosing to reproduce verbatim responses provided to Question 9166 and, in some 
cases, Questions 8 and 9.167  This approach was found to be taken in at least seventeen 
filings out of ninety–one.  This figure includes cases where registrants also merely 
indicated that the response to Question 10 was the same as responses to previous 
questions.  Given the standard for disclosures of “political activities,” and the 
differing premises of Questions 8 and 9, such a response is unlikely to satisfy the legal 
standard required for Question 10.  An exception to this would be where the responses 
 
162 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Saro Spadaro, question 10 (Mar. 9, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6399-Exhibit-
AB-20200309-39.pdf.  This filing merely states “See Attached Contract” in relation to questions 8–10.  
163 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Embassy of Qatar, Question 10 (Mar. 25, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6561-
Exhibit-AB-20200325-3.pdf. 
164 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, of Zari David (Eliezer) Kovo (Jan. 25, 2020), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6399-Exhibit-
AB-20200125-36.pdf. 
165 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Government of the Republic 
of China (BOFT) (Feb. 19, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/3988-Exhibit-AB-20200219-7.pdf (While the 
details provided in the Exhibit B form are limited (though likely sufficient), there is substantially more specific 
information provided concerning the objectives and methods of the representation in the attached contract 
between the registrant and foreign principal). 
166 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Talal F. Aldabbous (Jan. 27, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/3718-Exhibit-AB-
20200127-17.pdf.  In response to the question on political activities, the response merely states “See Question 9 
above.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
167 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6774-Exhibit-AB-20200207-2.pdf.  This filing merely states “Registrant will provide 
strategic consulting services, including representation before the U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, 
and U.S. executive branch agencies.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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of a registrant to Questions 8 and 9 were extremely broad and far exceeded the scope 
for each — a feature only observed in two instances.  
In relation to substantive requirements for disclosures of “political 
activities,” a defining trend was the lack of detail provided by registrants.  Of the 
ninety–one responses studied, only around nineteen filings were found to contain 
disclosures which disclosed issues/interests represented as well as the steps to be 
undertaken to achieve them.  While there were several cases that were on the margins, 
even by conservative estimates, more than half of the responses studied did not seem 
to contain adequately detailed disclosures relating to “political activities” to be 
undertaken by a registrant.  Several filings merely provided a solitary and 
uninformative line in response to the Question 10 prompt.  For instance, egregious 
cases included a filing where a registrant, in relation to “political activities”, merely 
stated: “Please see the attached contract.  Registrant’s services include consulting 
services in connection with public relations, media relations, government relations, 
and litigation.”168  The attached contract did not provide any additional details in 
relation to registrant “political activities” — barring that it would provide strategic 
consulting and management services in connection with unspecified pending 
litigation against the foreign principal before the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California.  While it is clear that this filing refers to ongoing litigation with 
Facebook, no part of the filing meets the “detailed” standard for disclosure of 
“political activities.”  
Several cases involved registrants providing detailed disclosures relating to 
the nature of activities proposed to be engaged in as part of the representation, but 
insufficient mention of the actual issues or policies sought to be influenced on behalf 
of the foreign principal.  For example, one registrant detailed its proposed activities 
but failed to specify the issues or policies that it sought to influence, apart from 
indicating that they related to “US-Honduras relations.”169 
At the same time, it may be misleading to suggest that all cases required a 
uniform standard of disclosure of “political activities.”  Through the review of filings, 
it was also observed that registrants were engaged for representations of varying 
breadth.  While some registrants were engaged solely around specific events170 or 
meetings,171 others were engaged for open-ended or extremely broad representations 
 
168 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Q Cyber Technologies Ltd. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6170-Exhibit-AB-
20200106-74.pdf (last visited May 22, 2020). 
169 Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938, as amended, Gov’t of Honduras (Jan 16, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5430-Exhibit-AB-20200116-
82.pdf (last visited May 22, 2020). 
170 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Consulum FZ LLC (Dec. 13, 2019), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6769-Exhibit-AB-
20191213-1.pdf.  The registrant was retained “to support the Saudi Film Council, General Cultural Authority, 
the Saudi leadership delegation and Saudi filmmakers . . . at the 2018 Cannes Film Festival.”  Id. at 5 (emphasis 
added).  This filing is also an example of one which was made seemingly after more than a year of delay.  Id. 
171 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Confindustria (Dec. 8, 2019), http://www.fara.gov/docs/6764-Exhibit-AB-20191208-
1.pdf.  The registrant was retained to accompany an Italian industry delegation to the U.S. and “moderate a 
roundtable and present short speech on the excellence of Italian exports in front of US audiences.”  Id. at 5 
(emphasis added).  This representation is an example of a time-limited agency relationship centered around a 
defined event. 
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— typically referring to all issues that may affect a particular foreign principal.172  It 
is reasonable to expect that the more limited the representation, the narrower 
disclosures it would require in relation to “political activities.”  In contrast, it is not 
clear how specific the disclosures in an open-ended registration must be.  In order to 
provide the public a reasonable chance to evaluate the activities of the registrant, it 
may be necessary to provide — at a minimum — indicative references to the broad 
objectives of the representation, types of issues likely to be influenced and the types 
of “political activities” likely to be engaged in for the same purposes.  These 
indicative disclosures would later be complemented by the Supplementary Statement 
filings of a registrant which, if in order, would operate to provide backward-looking 
disclosures of activities engaged in over the previous six-month period. 
Analysis of the dataset also suggests that disclosures of “political activities” 
are affected by the format of the agreement between the registrant and foreign 
principal.  Of the ninety-one Exhibit B forms disclosing “political activities,” twenty 
pertained to representations that were concluded orally (i.e., not in any written 
format).  Discounting four of these as they pertained to the same event/representation, 
the data suggests that at least ten out of the remaining sixteen filings did not contain 
adequate disclosures of “political activities.”  This is notable as orally concluded 
representations do not contain attachments such as contracts.  Therefore, where a 
representation is agreed to in unwritten form, third-party evaluation of the relationship 
will rely solely on disclosures made in responses to Questions 8, 9, and 10 (among 
others) of Exhibit B.173  This makes it all the more necessary that adequate detail be 
provided in these cases. 
Overall, the above survey provides a broad and non-exhaustive indication of 
the issues that currently subsist with the disclosure of “political activities” under 
FARA.  Well over half of the dataset analyzed likely did not meet the legal 
requirement for “detailed” with a number of other concerning trends also being 
observed.  If unaddressed, these issues may have the effect of challenging the very 
assumptions upon which FARA is built. Without permitting meaningful public 
scrutiny of agent activities, transparency cannot be effective. At very least, there is a 
case to be made for guidance which clarifies the applicable legal standard (whether 
to require more details or less) and promotes systemic consistency.  
 
CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
A. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The first part of this paper sought to introduce FARA, examine its historical roots, 
and identify the legal standard for disclosure of “political activities” under it.  Based 
 
172 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign 
Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, Afghanistan-U.S. Democratic Peace and Prosperity Council (Mar. 
19, 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6803-Exhibit-AB-20200319-1.pdf.  While in general the filing is detailed, 
it provides no details or examples of specific policy matters or issues relating to which it provides lobbying and 
related services. 
173 See, e.g., Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United States of America (Jan. 31, 
2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/6789-Exhibit-AB-20200131-1.pdf (providing insufficient disclosure 
information despite the lack of an attached contract). 
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on the analysis above, it concluded that there are strong reasons to suggest that 
disclosures of “political activities” must be “detailed” in the manner set out under § 
5.210 of the FARA regulations.  In other words, registrants under FARA must — in 
their Exhibit B filings — disclose their intended “political activities” in a manner 
that permits “meaningful public evaluation of each of the significant steps taken [by 
the registrant] to achieve the purposes of the agency relation.”174 
While there is no judicial or executive guidance as to what this standard 
amounts to in practice, a bare reading suggests that this must include disclosure of the 
issues underlying the representation and the steps taken to achieve them.  Moreover, 
this disclosure must be of such specificity that an ordinary person is able to draw 
reasonable conclusions regarding the “political activities” in question. 
Following on from the above, the second part of this Article sought to 
examine trends in compliance with this standard, among others, within a sample set 
of Exhibit B forms filed with the DOJ.  This survey revealed several problematic 
issues in relation to the quality of disclosures made by registrants in their filings.  It 
concluded that, if unaddressed, these issues have the potential to undermine the 
disclosure-centric approach of FARA.  
In relation to non-substantive issues relating to format, several concerns were 
observed.  The first of these was the inconsistent adoption of the most recent NSD-4 
form by registrants.  Despite the latest revision of NSD-4 (at the time of the above 
survey in March 2020) having been issued in 2019, several registrants continued to 
use the 2017 version of the form.175  This increases the enforcement burden as the 
newer version contained features that would have made it easier to detect delayed 
filings.  Second, principal-agent agreements, regardless of form and length, are treated 
in the same manner under FARA.  In other words, a 200-page written contract is 
treated at par with an unwritten agreement, and Exhibit B forms disclosing either are 
expected to conform to the same level of detail.  This is incongruous as written 
contracts tend to contain a wealth of information over and above disclosures made 
within the Exhibit B form.  In contrast, unwritten agreements are described solely on 
the basis of the disclosures made within Exhibit B.  As was observed, this leads to 
several instances where disclosures relating to non-contractual arrangements were 
clearly insufficient.  Third, several Exhibit B filings were incomplete in that they did 
not have accompanying Exhibit B forms and consisted of bare documents (such as 
contract amendments and renewals).  Similarly, several documents classified on the 
DOJ portal as Exhibit B forms did not contain Exhibit B itself.  
Several problematic trends were also observed in relation to disclosures of 
registrant activities.  The most notable of these was apparent registrant confusion in 
differentiating between the requirements of Questions 8 and 9 of NSD-4.  Registrants 
adopted varying approaches to answering these prompts and, in many cases, produced 
identical responses to both questions.  Second, registrants, in many cases, did not 
provide responses that either satisfied the requirements of the question prompt or met 
 
174 28 C.F.R. § 5.210 (2020). 
175 U.S. Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act of 1938, as amended (2017), superseded by Dep’t of Just., Exhibit B to Registration Statement Pursuant to 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended (2020), https://www.justice.gov/nsd-
fara/page/file/1273636/download. 
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the underlying legal standard.175  Registrants adopted varying strategies, in this 
regard, including providing vague responses and referring readers to attached 
contractual documents.  In many cases, the attached contractual documents were 
themselves insufficiently clear, too complex, or wholly unresponsive.  All of these 
trends, and especially the last, directly affect the ability of a third party to 
meaningfully evaluate the principal-agent representation. 
In relation to “political activities,” similar trends in registrant filings were 
observed.  At the outset, there were several cases where it was unclear if the parties 
had accurately classified their activities as being “political” in nature.  In this regard, 
seemingly non-political activities were identified as “political” and vice-versa.  Much 
like responses to Questions 8 and 9, responses to Question 10 were often identical 
reproductions of responses to previous questions or unsubstantiated references to 
contractual documents.  Both issues are problematic where the material referred to 
did not meet the legal standard for detail.  The final, and key, trend concerning 
“political activities” related to the quality of disclosures made by registrants.  Here, it 
was observed that a majority of the filings did not seem to meet the meaningful public 
evaluation standard discussed above.  Only a minority of disclosures adequately 
detailed the activities to be engaged in, as well as the underlying policy or political 
objectives.  There were also several egregious cases where disclosures were 
intentionally obfuscated to prevent third-party scrutiny of the ultimate beneficiary of 
registrant services, or the activities sought to be engaged in. 
Overall, these observations paint a worrying picture of the current state of 
FARA filings.  The trends pointed out above, individually as well as cumulatively, 
operate to frustrate the ability of stakeholders to meaningfully evaluate principal-
agent relationships.  While no generalizations should be drawn from the limited 
survey above, there are, at least, strong indications that the future of FARA will 
depend on further study and analysis of the quality of disclosures made by registrants.  
At the same time, the trends also revealed several gaps in the statute (and its 
implementation) which can undermine its effectiveness.  Targeted legislative and 
executive intervention can address these gaps and strengthen FARA as the primary 
mechanism to check foreign influence operations of a political nature.  Some of these 
are discussed below. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY & ENFORCEMENT 
 
The above sections sought to identify concerns with the current approach to 
filings and disclosures under FARA.  This Section aims to offer corrective policy and 
enforcement recommendations — particularly around Exhibit B filings.  For ease of 
reading, they have been presented in a bullet-point and simple-language format.  
 
i. Legislative & Policy Priorities 
 
 
176 In the absence of form-level guidance, it is likely that the general standard laid down in 22 U.S.C. § 
612(a)(4)  
will apply in relation to both fields.  It may also be noted that form NSD-4 was revised in May 2020, subsequent 
to the time period of filings surveyed in this Article. 
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(1) Clarifying legal standard: In order to promote clarity, the DOJ should clearly 
articulate and clarify the legal standard that FARA-filings in general, and 
disclosures of “political activities” specifically, must meet.  This involves 
reviewing and harmonizing the standard for “detailed” as present in 
regulations issued under FARA. 
 
(2) Benchmarking “detailed:” The standard for “detailed” must be a dynamic 
benchmark which provides a minimum standard and requires registrants to 
adduce additional material based on factors including: 
 
a. Length of attachments (such as contractual documents);  
b. Format of principal-agent arrangement (written vs. non-written); 
c. Nature and duration of the engagement (one-time vs. ongoing); and 
d. Scope of the arrangement (defined vs. open-ended). 
 
(3) Enforcing quality: The DOJ should take steps to improve FARA-related 
enforcement relating to quality of the disclosures made by registrants.  A 
critical part of this will be strengthening civil and criminal enforcement and 
disincentives in relation to poor-quality filings which do not meet requisite 
legal thresholds.  Merely filing an incomplete or vague filing should not grant 
a free pass to a registrant.  
 
ii. Filing-related Recommendations 
 
(1) Form clarity: NSD-4 must be amended to clarify the specific requirements 
(and inter se differentiate) between Questions 8, 9, and 10 of Exhibit B.  This 
involves providing formal or in-form guidance as to what registrants are 
expected to detail within each of these fields.  The DOJ may consider 
providing formal guidance or illustrations which explain each form field and 
details what must be addressed therein. 
 
(2) Incorporation by Reference: When registrants make a filing that is adjunct 
to a previous filing (such as an amendment, renewal, extension, or 
termination), they must be mandated to include such document as part of 
the new filing either in relevant part, or as a whole.  Registrants must not be 
permitted to make wholesale references to attached documents in place of 
answering any specific questions on Exhibit B.  In other words, 
incorporation by reference to responses must no longer be permitted. 
 
(3) Transparent Beneficiaries: NSD-4 must be amended to include a field 
requiring parties to disclose all known beneficiaries of the representation 
over and above the named foreign principal. 
 
iii. Unsigned Documents: Registrants must be required to certify as 
accurate (for example, through notation) any unsigned 
annexures or appendices to the contractual arrangement. 
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iv. Open-ended Representations: Registrants must be required to 
file separate and additional statements of work (SOWs) that 
may be executed pursuant to an open-ended contract. 
 
For optimal effect and consistency, these suggestions for intervention above 
should form part of future efforts at auditing, as well as legislative or regulatory 
reform. After all, FARA has not seen substantive reform in decades, while key 
portions of the DOJ’s regulations under the statute – including those relating to the 
level of detail requirement – have  not been reviewed since the 1960s.177  
As legislative pressure over FARA builds, if nothing else, the takeaway for 
policymakers from the above exercise must be that when it comes to FARA, the devil 
is in the details. Legislation concerned with amending FARA to cover larger policy 
gaps (e.g., jurisdiction over non-U.S. persons, and widening the definition of “foreign 
agent”) will only go so far. To truly ensure that FARA is effectual, such amendments 
should be combined with a microscopic study and review–by statutory mandate–of 
the minutiae of issues relating to FARA forms and filings. These instruments form 
the backbone of FARA and without efforts to address gaps and optimize their impact, 
compliance with the statute will be reduced to a box-checking exercise with little real 
impact on exposing foreign influence––its true purpose.  
 
 
177 BEN FREEMAN, BRIAN STEINER, AND TARUN KRISHNAKUMAR, RECENT PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE FOREIGN 
AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT: A SURVEY, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y (Apr 2021), https://3ba8a190-62da-4c98-86d2-
893079d87083.usrfiles.com/ugd/3ba8a1_893ea900a31846949820e13837a04a2e.pdf; 
